Human Embryo Adoption: Biotechnology, Marriage, and the Right to Life by Eberl, Jason T.
232 Linacre Quarterly
Book Reviews
Brugger, Williams, Ryan, and Barahona, Lu-
cas, and Alea). All but two essays in the lat-
ter category also support embryo rescue, in
which a woman agrees to gestate a cryopre-
served embryo who will be adopted once
born by another couple. Most of the contrib-
utors have written previously on this topic in
various scholarly venues. This volume thus
offers an excellent representation of the ar-
guments and positions that have informed
and influenced the current debate. Readers
may be curious as to how this text compares
to the similar collection edited by Sarah-
Vaughan Brakman and Darlene Fozard
Weaver. With appropriate humility— as I am
a contributor to the latter volume— I wish to
cite a few additional viewpoints Brakman
and Weaver offer that are lacking in the
Berg/Furton collection: 1) a wider theologi-
cal discussion that goes beyond sexual
morality and the “theology of the body,” in-
cluding a theology of adoption (Weaver);6 2)
personal witnesses from a mother and fa-
ther who have adopted embryos (Stanmeyer
and Stanmeyer); and 3) practical recom-
mendations for how a Catholic embryo adop-
tion agency may function in line with the
Church’s teachings (Berkman and Carey).
These points are not intended to assert that
the Brakman/ Weaver volume surpasses
Berg and Furton’s; rather, I have found that
both texts together offer readers a thorough
survey of the relevant viewpoints that merit
further discussion to settle the question of
whether couples— or individual women in
the case of rescue— may licitly act in order to
save human embryos from the indignity
of perpetual cryopreservation or eventual
destruction.
Human Embryo Adoption: 
Biotechnology, Marriage, and the Right to Life
edited by Rev. Thomas V. Berg and Edward J. Furton
Philadelphia, PA: The National Catholic Bioethics Center, 
2006. 347 pages.
The Linacre Quarterly 78(2) (May 2011): 232–240.
© 2011 by the Catholic Medical Association. All rights reserved.
0024-3639/2011/7802-0013 $.30/page.
This collection offers a well-balanced
presentation of ethical arguments for and
against a timely and controversial issue
among Catholic bioethicists: viz., whether
it is permissible for a woman or married
couple to adopt cryopreserved embryos
produced by another couple through in
vitro fertilization (IVF), the genetic par-
ents having renounced their moral obliga-
tion to provide these embryos with the
possibility of gestation and development
into fully actualized human persons. Both
this volume and a similar collection to
which this reviewer contributed1 were pro-
duced before the publication of the Con-
gregation for the Doctrine of the Faith’s
instruction Dignitas personae On Certain
Bioethical Questions, which addresses this
issue without levying a definitive in princi-
ple conclusion against the practice, but
rather citing unspecified “problems of a
medical, psychological and legal nature.”2
Despite arguments to the contrary,3 it seems
that the Congregation for the Doctrine of
the Faith has purposely left open the ques-
tion of whether one may pursue embryo
adoption in good conscience,4 assuming
perhaps that certain practical hurdles are
overcome.5 Hence the present volume re-
mains a relevant and valuable contribution
to the continued debate among Catholic
bioethicists.
The twelve essays that comprise this col-
lection are evenly divided between those
who argue that embryo adoption is morally
illicit (Pacholczyk, Watt, Tonti-Filippini,
Austriaco, Oleson, and Geach) and those
who support the practice (Berkman, May,
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I will now address various points in
the essays that Berg and Furton have com-
missioned. John Berkman supports em-
bryo adoption based on the central claims
that it satisfies the requirements of being a
“virtuous parent” insofar as the adoptive
couple has a “permanent concern for the
physical, emotional, moral, and spiritual
welfare of the child” (24), and it does not
violate the adoptive couple’s marital union
insofar as the process of receiving and ges-
tating an embryo in this fashion in no way
constitutes a “marital act.” Berkman is crit-
ical, though, of a single woman rescuing an
embryo without the commitment to adopt
and raise the child once born, labeling such
an act a form of “surrogacy” in which “the
rescuer— to put it bluntly— intends premed-
itated child abandonment” (32). Would
such a woman “abandon” the child she has
rescued, however, if she has pre-arranged
for another couple to adopt the child im-
mediately upon birth? While there may be
reasons to reject embryo rescue as a form
of illicit surrogacy, “premeditated aban-
donment” cannot be one of these reasons
if a loving couple is ready to welcome the
child. As Fr. Peter Ryan contends, a woman
who rescues an embryo “should intend to
do what she reasonably can to make sure
the child is cared for and brought up prop-
erly.... But she need not plan to fulfill that
responsibility by raising the child herself”
(318). I would advocate a stricter require-
ment that the woman ensure that the child
be adopted and raised by parents who have
agreed to take on this responsibility before
any embryos are implanted; of course, the
prospective adoptive parents— for justifi-
able or unjustifiable reasons— may back
out of the arrangement during gestation,
but such a decision would not impugn the
rescuer’s initial motive when she had the
embryos implanted.
Fr. Tadeusz Pacholczyk objects to em-
bryo adoption, in part, by suggesting an
expansive definition of “procreation” that
does not cease with fertilization, but con-
tinues throughout gestation as an ontolog-
ical extension of the conjugal act by means
of which fertilization occurred (43). This
way of redefining “procreation” seems ad
hoc since Catholic bioethicists typically
understand a human embryo— in utero, in
vitro, or frozen— to be a wholly present,
even if not fully actualized, human being;
there is nothing further to complete with
respect to the embryo’s basic existence as
a being with the same ontological and
moral status as you or I have. What gesta-
tion, and later child-rearing, offers is a
supportive environment for the embryo/
fetus/child to actualize her intrinsic po-
tentialities. If the procreative act is to
be extended throughout gestation, then
why stop at birth, since a newborn in-
fant remains fundamentally dependent
on her parents to provide the means of
her continued survival, development, and
flourishing? Similar points are raised by
E. Christian Brugger (202– 203). If the
procreative act, as Fr. Pacholczyk defines
it, cannot be assumed by another individ-
ual or couple through embryo adoption,
postnatal adoption is in danger of being
rendered morally illicit as well. At the end
of his essay, Fr. Pacholczyk considers the
case of a couple who utilizes IVF to resolve
their infertility issues, but when the wife
returns to the clinic to have some of the
embryos implanted, she repents of having
created embryos in this manner. What
should she do now? Fr. Pacholczyk con-
tends that “the morally proper step for her
would be to leave the clinic, even though
these embryos, of which she is the genetic
mother, are in fact her own children” (51).
An intuitive reading of this situation would
label such an act a more true form of aban-
donment than what Berkman is concerned
with in his rejection of embryo rescue.
The licitness of homologous embryo
transfer is another divisive point among
Catholic bioethicists in this debate: Fr. Pa-
cholczyk and Nicholas Tonti-Filippini re-
ject it, while Helen Watt and Fr. Nicanor
Austriaco, who both object to embryo adop-
tion, allow for it. In line with Fr. Pacholczyk’s
judgment that even the genetic mother of
embryos produced in vitro may not licitly
have them implanted in her body, Tonti-
Filippini’s recommended “solution” to the
plight of cryopreserved embryos is to re-
move them from storage and allow them to
die from lack of a nourishing and support-
ive environment (112), claiming that this is
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a “natural” way to resolve the issue insofar
as embryos would be exposed to the nat-
ural effects of time from which they had
been artificially sheltered by the frozen en-
vironment. A death that comes in vitro,
however, isolated from any physical hu-
man connection, and in which an embryo
is merely allowed to return to a natural
temperature, is far from being in accor-
dance with nature in the sense intended by
the natural law mandate to protect and
provide for the natural human inclination
to live— and so a “fundamental right to ges-
tation” is defended by Fr. Thomas Williams
(236). When a frozen embryo is deliber-
ately removed from storage without any
subsequent implantation, there can be lit-
tle doubt that the outcome will inevitably
result in death; Mónica López Barahona
et al. thus argue, “An act of thawing that is
not followed by transfer into a womb does
not let the embryo die, but actively causes
its death” (285). Furthermore, Donum vi-
tae asserts, “It is therefore not in conform-
ity with the moral law deliberately to
expose to death human embryos obtained
in vitro”7— to be clear, this passage is refer-
ring to scientific experimentation, yet it is
not difficult to see how the principle may
be extended to any other practice that
knowingly exposes embryos to death.
Due to the Congregation for the Doc-
trine of the Faith’s ambiguous judgment
regarding embryo adoption in Dignitas
personae— with subsequent “clarifications”
by the United States Catholic Bishops
and the Pontifical Academy for Life having
failed to close the window of interpreta-
tion— the arguments, objections, and re-
sponses generated by the contributors to
this volume, the Brakman/Weaver vol-
ume, and other scholarly venues will re-
main relevant touchstones for deliberation
so long as the IVF industry continues to
produce “spare” embryos who are subject
to cryopreservation and move the hearts of
pro-life individuals and couples who ar-
dently desire to save them from this “ab-
surd fate.”
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